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This paper explores the operational activities of the London Stock 
Exchange in the 21st century to provide an overview of its 
operational transparency and competitiveness; the competition 
among its market participants and how it competes with other 
developed stock exchanges around the world. Evidence was found 
that suggests the manifestation of both competitive and 
uncompetitive practices in the London Stock Exchange. The 
presence of the key elements that enhance the competitiveness of 
the market, such as continued technology transformation, 
strategies that promote globalisation and regulatory flexibilities was 
observed. Simultaneously, signs of non-competitiveness such as 
high membership and annual fees, transaction costs and stamp 
duties were also observed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The existence of an effective financial system is one 
of the key determinants of economic development 
(Bayraktar, 2014). The link between the financial 
system and economic development is responsible 
for the special attention given to all financial 
markets, including stock exchanges. Since the 
greatest amount of capital is exchanged through 
stock exchanges around the world, national 
economic growth is undoubtedly the function of 
stock market performance (Rounaghi and Zadeh, 
2016). Many studies have been undertaken to 
establish the extent of the relationship between 
stock exchange performance and economic 
development (see also Kothari, 2001; Pan and 
Mishra, 2018; Ngare et al., 2014; Nieuwerburgh et al., 
2006). The important role played by stock markets 
in national economic development has been very 
obvious because of the wave of globalisation and 
competition among stock exchanges across the 
globe (Amira and Muzere, 2011). Due to the effect of 
globalisation and competition, the stock liquidity of 
stock markets has been improved (Holmstrom, 1982; 
Grossman and Hart, 1983). Scholars such as Chung 
et al. (2010) have gone further to suggest that 
effective competition leads to an increase in stock 
liquidity and good governance oversight. An 
alternative view is that competition decreases the 
stock liquidity of stock exchanges and may 
encourage the dealers to widen bid-ask spreads and 
thus, results in high transaction costs (Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985). 
The competitive forces in the London Stock 
Exchange were assessed to provide evidence of the 
mechanisms that dictate the operations and 
behaviour of the market. Competitive characteristics 
or elements such as pricing methods, level of 
transaction costs, transparency and regulatory 
bureaucracy are studied in the following subsections 
to determine the level of operational 
competitiveness in the London Stock Exchange. The 
perception of the meaning of ‘competition’ in an 
exchange has been described as ambiguous. It is 
seen in different ways. The common perception 
reckons it as the presence of fair rivalry between 
market participants in the same economic 
environment and of a market structure that enables 
Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & Institutions/ Volume 8, Issue 2, Spring 2018 
75  
fragmentation for the equal involvement of all 
participants. In addition, the market should be of 
sufficient size so that no single participant can 
influence the pricing of assets, there should be no 
differential laws and regulations controlling the 
participants and generally, it must be considered as 
a ‘level playing ground’. It must also have free entry 
and exit and instant perfect information to all 
participants. Also, the equities traded must be 
homogenous in terms of risk and return assessment.  
The emphasis of this paper is to examine 
competition from both within and outside the 
Exchange by focusing on the level of restrictions on 
market participants; regulatory flexibility; fair 
pricing; levels of transaction costs; activities of 
market makers, brokers and institutional investors; 
transparency and generally the equality of 
opportunity given to every participant. In relation to 
competition among the top stock exchanges in the 
world, the competitiveness of the London market 
will be viewed from the angle of its ability to attract 
new companies for listing, potential investors and 
other market participants. 
The remaining part of the paper is organised as 
follows. Section 2 presents a review of the relevant 
literature. Section 3 explains the methodology 
adopted in the study. Section 4 discusses the 
findings of the study, including the discussion of the 
competitive attributes of the LSE. Section 5 presents 
the conclusion of the study, including the areas of 
further research. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Market transparency in stock exchanges can increase 
liquidity and enhance price efficiency (Biais, 1993). 
Madhavan (1995) has a contrary opinion on the 
relationship between market transparency and stock 
liquidity. This scholar has suggested that market 
participants avoid highly transparent markets 
because dealers and large traders benefit from 
systems that are not unified. According to 
Madhavan, this behaviour of the traders causes 
market illiquidity and an increase in market 
volatility. Madhavan’s findings are contrary to the 
findings of many theoretical papers, such as that of 
Pagano and Röell (1996) that compared various 
trading systems, concluding that transparent 
systems provide protection to uninformed investors 
and create liquidity in the market. Frutos and 
Manzano (2014) added that transparency in stock 
exchanges increases market liquidity and reduces 
price volatility only if perfect competition exists. In 
assessing the transparency of stock exchanges, the 
ability of traders to access information in the 
trading process, for example, trading volumes and 
prices, order flows, bid-ask quotes and the activities 
of market participants among others are the key 
parameters to measure (Comerton-Rydge and Rydge, 
2006). On disclosing the unexecuted orders of just 
five of the best bid and ask quotes, both the bid-ask 
spread and the standard deviation of returns in the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange decreased significantly, 
implying an increase in market quality (Ke et al., 
2013). The degree of market transparency has been 
identified by Lescourret and Robert (2011) as one of 
the factors that determine the competitiveness of a 
stock market.  
According to Lo (2013), the competitiveness of 
a stock exchange depends on factors such as the 
effectiveness of the listing process, level of 
transparency, regulatory framework, liquidity, price 
discovery, easy access and shareholders’ protection. 
These factors were presented in a competition 
matrix that broadly recognised competition for 
listing by firms and competition for trading by 
investors on a given stock exchange as key 
information for measuring its competitiveness. Many 
scholars have the same viewpoint as Lo (2013). For 
example, on the regulatory framework, Coffee (2001) 
and Klein (2005) argue that large firms would be 
attracted by stock exchanges that have strong 
regulatory and accounting standards. On the listing 
process, Pagano et al. (2001) and Serifsoy (2007) 
believe that the effectiveness of the listing process 
in a stock exchange attracts large firms for greater 
visibility. Stock liquidity is also seen as a product of 
effective electronic trading systems that attract 
investors and thus, improve stock exchanges’ 
competitiveness (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). 
However, scholars like Madhavan (1995) have a 
contrary opinion on whether some of these factors 
determine the competitiveness of stock exchanges. 
For instance, he argued that if the level of 
transparency is high in a stock exchange, many 
traders would not be attracted to that market since 
their gain is limited. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The study was conducted through a review of the 
operational activities of the London Stock Exchange 
using both internal and external desk research 
methods. Secondary information was collected and 
analysed from various published reports, journal 
articles, news releases, texts and publications of the 
London Stock Exchange. In general terms, the 
methodology of the study is entirely based on the 
principles of a qualitative research approach. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. London Stock Exchange and the UK economy 
 
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) plays a significant 
role in the UK economy and its development. The UK 
economy is the world’s fifth largest by nominal 
gross domestic product (GDP) at over US $2.85 
trillion and is the world’s eighth largest by 
purchasing power parity (PPP) at over US$ 2.64 
trillion, (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2015). It 
is also the fourth largest exporter and importer in 
the world. It has the second largest flow of inward 
foreign direct investment which directly reflects the 
role of the London Stock Exchange in attracting 
foreign capital. The economy is generally 
characterised as a free but partially controlled 
market and is considered to be among the most 
globalised in the world. As the first economy that 
witnessed the industrial revolution in the mid-18th 
century, it has a remarkable influence on the overall 
global economy with its capital city of London being 
one of the largest financial centres in the world. 
Unsurprisingly, the Exchange remains one of the 
largest security markets in the world, based on 
parameters such as market capitalisation, number of 
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listed companies (both foreign and local) and 
incentives to small and growing companies seeking 
share quotations, (Lees, 2012). In 1986, the exchange 
undertook a major restructuring of its market 
structure in activities referred to as ‘Big-Bang’, which 
became a blueprint for other exchanges in the world. 
The key changes during the ‘Big-Bang’ era 
encompass the permission of 100% external 
ownership of the Exchange, abolition of fixed 
commissions and charges, distinction between the 
functions of stockbrokers and that of stock jobbers, 
introduction of the fully automated trading systems 
and changes in the regulatory framework of the 
Exchange. The Exchange also become a private 
limited company under the Companies Act (1985) 
and stopped individual members from having voting 
rights as part of the deregulation that took place 
during the period. It was reported that not long after 
the ‘Big-Bang’ deregulation, the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) undertook a similar reorganisation. 
For this reason, the London Stock Exchange is also 
referred to as a ‘pace-setter’ in the operational or 
business model of global financial exchanges. 
The London Stock Exchange had a market 
capitalisation of more than US $6.06 trillion (£4.09 
(GBP) trillion) as at the end of December 2014 which 
was more than 200% of the country’s nominal GDP 
(London Stock Exchange, 2015a). As of March 2015, 
there are 2,426 companies from over 100 countries 
that are listed on the exchange. Forty-four percent 
(or 1,088 companies) are listed on the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) and 1,338 companies are 
listed on the main market (London Stock Exchange, 
2015b). According to the published Annual Report 
(2014) of the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG), 
the capital market segment has generated revenues 
of more than £309 million, representing about 26% 
of the group’s total income for the year ended March 
2014. The income from the capital market is derived 
from the three segments of primary listing, 
secondary trading and other service activities. The 
primary segment generates income mainly from 
admission fees for new listings, for raising 
additional capital and from annual charges levied on 
all listed companies. From the secondary segment of 
the market, fees on transactions (value traded) in 
existing UK equities and bonds are the main source 
of income. Membership fees from firms and other 
market players, such as stock brokers, stock jobbers, 
market makers, clearing firms or houses, issuing 
security firms, advisers and underwriters who access 
the trading markets, constitute part of the other 
activities that generate income for the market. 
Pricing procedures and the level of other fees are 
among the attributes to be explored in order to 
assess the competitiveness of the Exchange. 
LSE remains attractive to investors because of 
its dynamic nature, especially after the 1986 Big-
Bang deregulation that created the automated 
trading system in which face-to-face trading was 
substituted for computer-based trading, the AIM for 
small and growing companies and the techMARK 
exchange for high-tech and healthcare companies. 
The extent of competitiveness in the London Stock 
Exchange would have a significant impact on its 
global financial position. 
 
 
4.2. Competitive attributes of the London Stock 
Exchange 
 
In the context of stock exchanges, the level of 
competition in their operations is determined by the 
characteristics of competitive elements which are 
considered to be a reflection of the transparency and 
effectiveness in policy formulations of the Exchange. 
The most influential elements considered in this 
section are discussed in the following subsections. 
 
4.2.1. Pricing and trading volume information 
disclosure 
 
Millennium IT (an information technology firm 
owned by the LSE), provides most of the trading 
facilities and services at the London Stock Exchange 
that are used in the pricing of listed securities. The 
trading services are designed to cover different 
segments of the market based on the nature of their 
trading activities. For instance, SETS (Stock Exchange 
Electronic Trading Service) provides a platform as an 
electronic order book giving executable price 
quotations for the constituents of the FTSE 100 (a 
share index that constitutes the top 100 companies 
that have the highest market capitalisation on the 
LSE), FTSE 250 (a share index that constitutes the 
101st to 350th companies in market capitalisation on 
the LSE) and FTSE SmallCap (a share index that 
constitutes the 351st to 619th companies in market 
capitalisation on the LSE) indices, highly liquid AIM 
securities and Irish and London secondary listed 
securities. SETSqx (with the support of market 
makers) is a similar platform to SETS, but delivers 
non-electronically executable quotations and covers 
main market securities that are not traded by SETS. 
There is also SETSqx (without the support of market 
makers), which is an electronic order book auction 
for the main market securities that are not traded 
via SETS and not supported by market makers. Stock 
Exchange Automated Quotations or SEAQ is another 
trading platform or facility that provides non-
electronically executable quotations for sterling 
bonds and convertibles with market maker support. 
There are numerous trading facilities, such as the 
ones listed above, in the Exchange that allow the 
execution of trading activities which directly deal 
with the pricing of securities. 
The disclosure of information with regard to 
the pricing procedures and trading volume is a key 
element that signifies the extent of transparency and 
competitiveness of the Exchange. The information 
includes the details of the trading schedule with the 
timings, the basis of calculating both the opening 
and closing prices, price monitoring activities, 
market maker activities, settlement processes and 
trading volume. The rules of the London Stock 
Exchange contain a section that provides the 
requirements or standards for the disclosure of 
information. The standards in the rules have 
emphasised that market participants should ensure 
information disclosed or released in the Exchange is 
in all respects accurate, timely, complete and not 
misleading. The trading volume information also 
plays an important role in determining the market 
forces of demand and supply and thus, the security 
price. Presently, the Exchange also displays on its 
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website the information on the five-day trading 
volume of every listed security and that enhances 
transparency. The turnover volume and value, 
including the number of trades undertaken, are also 
published on a daily, monthly and yearly basis on 
the Exchange’s website. However, the monopolistic 
status of Millennium IT, which provides the facilities 
for trading services, may hinder the competitiveness 
that is expected from the market. The firm is the 
major provider of the automated trading facilities or 
platforms on the Exchange, and being without a 
competitor could affect the effectiveness of the 
services. Although appropriate rules exist, it is 
always difficult to ascertain if there is full and 
effective compliance.  
 
4.2.2. Settlement and clearing processes 
 
Member firms are expected by the ‘Rules of the 
Exchange’ to ensure that every transaction effected 
by them is duly cleared and settled at a reasonable 
time. It does not matter whether the member firm 
acted as a principal or an agent. Clearing member 
firms are expected to clear all trades after each 
transaction, provided they are part of a clearing 
membership agreement with any relevant central 
counterparty (a firm that takes the risk of being a 
selling party to a matched buyer and also being a 
buying party to a matched seller) in a given central 
counterparty security. It is a process that occurs 
after the electronic trading of matching buyers and 
sellers using trading facilities has taken place. After 
the matching of buyers and sellers (electronic 
trading), clearing firms would take the risk of being 
buyers and sellers and, if there is a default from any 
of the actual parties, the clearing firm must buy or 
sell the stock. Settlement occurs after clearance and 
it is the process of delivering the title of ownership 
of the financial instruments to the actual owner, 
which is usually after three days in terms of equity 
stocks. The settlement should comply with the 
terms agreed during the time of the trade or 
transaction. In both the clearing and settlement 
processes, participating members are expected to 
comply with the provisions of the rules in order to 
make sure the market is efficient. Since 2014, the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) under which the 
LSE operates has placed an obligation on the 
Exchange to ensure adequate supervision of the 
activities of any member firm that uses its facilities. 
The efforts of the FCA are meant to provide equal 
opportunities to all market players, as well as 
enhance the competitiveness of the Exchange.  
 
4.2.3. Pricing initial public offerings (IPOs) and 
transaction costs 
 
The process of pricing and valuing IPOs is seen as a 
significant element in assessing the competitiveness 
of an exchange. An IPO is the first public issue of 
equity shares by a company seeking a quotation on a 
stock exchange. It is also referred to as a flotation in 
the UK markets and provides an opportunity to 
transform a private company (Ltd status) to a 
publicly listed company (Plc status). It is an 
important process that involves a number of 
participants, such as banks, accountants, 
underwriting firms, financial advisers, consultants 
and legal firms. London’s IPO market has been very 
vibrant over the years compared to other world 
major stock exchanges. According to the LSE 
Group’s Annual Report (2014), the exchange raised 
about £6.5 billion as equity capital for new 
companies from IPOs in the year ended 2014, 
thereby generating about £39.9 million in income for 
the Exchange. The Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) is another segment of the LSE that showed 
evidence of high new share issue activity. In the year 
ended 2014, over 100 small and growing companies 
were floated on the market, contributing a 
significant proportion of the £39.9 million generated 
from IPOs by the exchange in 2014. 
The concern of whether IPOs are traded at an 
issue price below or above the real value of 
companies, thereby giving undue benefits to some 
individuals and institutions, depends on the 
transparency in the exchange. Financial institutions 
acting as issue managers could over-value 
companies that are preparing IPOs in order to secure 
business deals from the firms. Similarly, company 
managers can also set the issue price of IPOs at less 
than the true value if they are also potential owners 
of the floated companies, so that they pay less for 
ownership. In a publication entitled Leadership in a 
changing global economy: the future of London’s IPO 
market by the London Stock Exchange Group (2011), 
it was confirmed that there were comments on the 
lack of transparency in London’s IPO market which 
gives an added advantage to some individuals and 
results in the sudden rise of share prices 
immediately after flotation. However, the report has 
concluded that the basis of those comments was 
unsubstantiated and opined that London’s IPOs are 
more fairly priced compared to other international 
stock exchanges such as New York (NYSE) and Hong 
Kong (HKEx). On the same note, the report 
recommends a way forward by supporting the 
establishment of more avenues for pre-IPO 
engagement and research where stakeholders can 
have enough time to assess companies in the 
pipeline for an IPO. The fee structure of IPOs has 
been argued to be more dependent on the current 
financial position of companies than on their long-
term stability. This has contributed to security 
issuing houses over-valuing company shares to 
maximise the fees paid to them. To improve fairness 
in the pricing of IPOs, the exchange should ensure 
transparency in all the processes of floating a 
company by involving investors (representation from 
investor clubs, unions or associations) in the 
valuation of companies.  
Transaction costs such as brokerage 
commissions and other trading fees incurred when 
selling or buying shares in the secondary market, 
and stamp duties charged during the flotation of 
shares are considered to be high in the London Stock 
Exchange. According to Financial News (2015), LSE 
transaction costs are almost four times higher than 
that in some competitor exchanges such as BATS 
Europe (a recognised pan-European investment 
exchange in the UK and subsidiary of BATS Global 
Markets that is based in Kansas, United States). 
Hawkins and McCrae (2002) explain that the key 
components of transaction costs include the 
brokerage commission and bid-ask spread. The 
brokerage commission in the LSE ranges between 0% 
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for institutional investors and 5% for smallest 
private investors. The bid-ask spread varies 
according to the type of securities, market segments 
and method of trade (via order book, off-order book, 
electronically or non-electronically). According to the 
London Stock Exchange (2001), the total transaction 
costs in the Exchange in the first quarter of 2001 
were 0.72% including stamp duty. The LSEG (2011) 
report on the future of London’s IPO market also 
confirms that the stamp duty on the transaction 
value of shares (0.5% of the transaction value) in the 
LSE and in the South Korea Exchange has the highest 
rates in the world, exposing these markets to a 
competitive disadvantage. It is arguable that the 
competitiveness of an exchange is improved if 
trading costs are not set at a level that is too high. 
Hsieh et al (2018) have argued that well-functioning 
stock exchanges have low transaction costs, and that 
allows market participants to transact large amounts 
of stocks and thus, enhances market liquidity. 
 
4.2.4. Membership and annual fees 
 
On admission, new member firms (such as brokers, 
advisers, market makers and underwriters) of the 
London Stock Exchange are required to pay a fixed 
admission fee of £10,000 which entitles the firms to 
operate for the next 12 months without paying 
annual fees. Existing member firms pay a flat rate of 
£12,500 in annual fees, although an annual credit of 
£2,500 is given against the fees charged for the use 
of trading services for equities and exchange-traded 
products. The membership of the exchange allows 
the member firms to undertake various trading 
services under relevant regulations in the market. In 
its effort to improve the competitiveness of the 
exchange, LSE has made some changes to the 
membership structure of fees, which includes a 
payment of flat rate annual fees instead of using 
annual headcount declarations of activities to 
calculate yearly fees, the introduction of a 20% 
discount on annual fees and an annual credit of 
£2,500 on fees for the use of trading services. It is 
believed that these changes would enhance 
transparency and also reduce administrative 
bureaucracy. In contrast to LSE, the membership fees 
of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) are not fixed 
but are determined by the forces of demand and 
supply which range between $4,000 and $2,500,000 
per annum. In the case of low demand for 
membership of the NYSE by potential member firms, 
the fee could be significantly lower than that of the 
London Stock Exchange. In the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE), basic annual fees for membership 
are JPY 400,000 (£2,200) per trading participant, 
which is also lower than that of the LSE. At the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE), membership annual 
fees are between €2,500 (£1,800) and €6,000 
(£4,312).  
In the face of efforts by the LSE to reduce its 
membership fees and the level of administrative 
bureaucracy, the exchange’s annual fees remain the 
highest among many top stock exchanges in the 
world. Based on the comparison of fees between LSE, 
NYSE, TSE and FSE made above, the LSE would have a 
competitive disadvantage because with the 
globalisation of stock exchange activity, competent 
market participants may seek membership on less 
expensive exchanges. 
 
4.2.5. Member firms of the London Stock Exchange 
and their activities 
 
Most of the activities of the LSE are undertaken by 
its member firms. The members of the Exchange 
(referred to as ‘member firms’) are firms that 
specialise in areas such as stockbroking, market 
making, trading services, underwriting, listing of 
securities, provision of investment advice, market 
making, clearing and settlement services, share issue 
activities and other legal services. These services are 
usually rendered to clients (companies seeking 
equity capital, plus individual and institutional 
investors) using trading facilities available at various 
platforms of the Exchange. The firms are admitted 
as members based on certain criteria and 
requirements of the Exchange. As of May 2015, the 
London Stock Exchange has over 800 registered 
members that are allowed to operate in various 
market segments, such as new equity capital market, 
fixed income market, derivatives markets and 
trading systems, based on their expertise. In 
carrying out their duties, the admitted members 
need to have access to real-time market data and 
trading facilities in order to render effective and 
competitive trading services. For their own part, the 
member firms ensure compliance with the ‘London 
Stock Exchange Rules’ and the timely payment of all 
applicable fees. In return, member firms are 
expected to operate in an environment characterised 
by offering fair treatment and equal opportunities to 
all members. For the Exchange to be competitive, 
there must be perfect, free and instant information, 
together with free entry and exit for all participants. 
However, the extent and strictness of the ‘Rules’, the 
different sizes and specialisms of member firms and 
the high admission and annual fees may negatively 
affect the competitiveness of the Exchange. The 
Exchange has been characterised as having high 
admission and annual fees compared to some of the 
top world’s stock exchanges. Having fixed fees and 
stamp duties can also affect member firms that are 
small in size. The specialist or professional 
segments of the market, such as the Specialist Fund 
Market (SFM) and Professional Securities Market 
(PSM) where only member firms that possess the 
appropriate skills can operate, may bring unfairness 
to other participating members. For instance, the 
listing of Islamic bonds on the Exchange, which has 
raised over US$ 51 billion to date, may require only 
the services of member firms that have the 
knowledge of the Islamic legal system and that may 
put other members at a disadvantage. The Exchange 
should provide a platform where all members can 
acquire the basic knowledge of dealing in specialist 
securities in order to have an equal opportunity of 
participation. In addition, fixed admission fees that 
are irrespective of a firm’s size should be abolished 
and replaced by a system that recognises the 
different sizes of participating member firms.  
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4.2.6. Activities of market makers, brokers and 
institutional investors 
 
The activities of market makers, brokers, and 
institutional investors remain contentious when it 
comes to the issue of whether all member firms are 
given equal opportunities for participation. Market 
makers or liquidity providers are firms that quote 
both the buy and sell prices of a stock and are 
prepared to buy or sell at any time in order to make 
a profit from the bid-offer spread. Stockbrokers are 
known as agents or mediators that buy or sell stocks 
on behalf of individuals and institutional investors 
for a commission referred to as brokerage. 
Institutional investors are organisations that put 
together large funds for investment in securities and 
other assets. Pension funds administrators, unit 
trust and mutual funds managers, insurance 
companies and investment trust companies can all 
be institutional investors. Market makers, 
stockbrokers, and institutional investors are key 
players of every stock exchange and can equally be 
registered as members of that exchange. If a market 
lacks transparency, market makers can influence the 
price of securities to their advantage or that of 
institutional investors. On a similar note, 
institutional investors can gain an undue advantage 
by having access to any market information that is 
not available to other investors. Therefore, the 
activities of these players are supposed to be 
monitored for the purpose of ensuring fair 
competition among all the participants. Atawnah et 
al. (2018) are of the opinion that most managers are 
not transparent and are more likely to send the 
wrong signal to the market, especially when they are 
under competitive pressure. In the London Stock 
Exchange, there are established market making rules 
that are related to both order and off-order book 
trading. The rules contain the registration process of 
a member firm as a market maker, obligations such 
as the minimum size of quotes and any exceptions 
to those obligations. The contentious issue is 
whether the rules are effectively complied with by all 
market participants. 
 
4.2.7. Regulatory framework 
 
The structure of the financial market is mainly 
regulated by the Financial Services Act 1986 (FSA), 
which was superseded by the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSM) and also the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) alongside the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA) in 2012. The Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA) are now responsible for 
the various statutory and regulatory provisions 
guiding the operations of the market. Formerly, this 
was undertaken by the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA). A new trading system or an exchange such as 
BATS Europe or the LSE itself has an option to 
choose between the various laws and regulations of 
operation in the United Kingdom. The choice 
depends on whether the trading system or the 
exchange is to conduct investment business or other 
financial services in the UK. For investment 
business, the exchange may select to either be 
authorised for operations or be exempted if it 
operates outside the UK under the former Financial 
Services Act. Before the introduction of the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA), the authorisation could 
also be obtained directly from the Securities and 
Investment Board (SIB) (a body formed as a regulator 
to ensure compliance with most of the provisions of 
both the defunct Financial Services Act and Financial 
Services and Market Act) or indirectly by being a 
member of one of the Self-Regulating Organisations 
(SRO), such as the Securities and Futures Authority 
(SFA) and the London Stock Exchange (LSE). As a 
former self-regulating organisation, the Securities 
and Futures Authority (SFA) governs all firms, 
including issuing houses and banks operating in the 
UK securities and futures markets, with the primary 
role of protecting investors. Automated trading 
firms such as BEST, POSIT, TRADE and Instinet 
(firms that provided and managed automated 
trading systems in the Exchange before the 
acquisition of MillenniumIT by the London Stock 
Exchange Group) have chosen to be regulated 
indirectly by becoming members of both the 
Securities and Futures Authority (SFA) and the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) as self-regulating 
organisations. A trading system can also select to be 
exempted from regulations under the Financial 
Services and Markets Act if it does not carry out 
investment business in the UK or outside the UK. 
The exemptions are obtained through becoming a 
member of any of the international securities SROs, 
such as the International Securities Market 
Association (ISMA) and Recognised Overseas 
Investment Exchanges, or Recognised Investment 
Exchanges such as the National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ). 
The new Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) have taken 
over the functions of the SIB and the SFA as well as 
the supervision of SROs that were under the former 
Financial Services Act in order to streamline the 
financial regulations in the UK. 
The London Stock Exchange is a Self-Regulating 
Organisation (SRO) that has specific rules and 
regulations, referred to as ‘Rules of the Exchange’, 
with which members must comply. The rules of the 
exchange provide the overall code of conduct on the 
London Stock Exchange and are the operational 
requirements for all member firms. Trading rules for 
both order and off-order books are also specified. 
An order book is an official list of both buy and sell 
orders from potential buyers and sellers of a 
security, while an off-order book refers to ‘outside 
order book’ or in other words, not recorded in the 
order book. In trading, member firms can decide to 
use an order book trading strategy where the 
Exchange’s trading system or facility is used to 
record and match buy and sell orders. They also 
have the option to boycott the Exchange’s trading 
facility in selling or buying a security. Guidelines for 
market makers (MM), who are member firms such as 
J.P. Morgan Securities Plc, trading settlements and 
clearing processes are also provided. It also has the 
details of compliance procedures and default 
consequences for any member firm that fails to 
comply with the rules. Companies that are listed on 
the exchange are deemed to have been complying 
with one of the most respected sets of admission 
and disclosure requirements, (London Stock 
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Exchange, 2015). Both potential and existing 
investors in those companies would also be expected 
to enjoy the benefit from the system that ensures 
the highest operational standards for investor 
confidence. The LSE admission and disclosure 
standards (rules and responsibilities with regard to 
the admission of companies for trading and 
continuing obligations of member firms and 
admitted companies in the disclosure of 
information) are provided for companies based on 
the route into the main market or the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM). Larger companies comply 
with higher or strict standards compared to the 
admission and disclosure standards of growing 
companies. Subsequent to the successful admission 
and listing of a company’s equity on the Exchange, 
there are also numerous continuing obligations for 
quoted firms, such as adherence to market guidance, 
payment of fees, compliance and appeals, 
timetabling for corporate actions, disciplinary 
procedures and compliance with changes in market 
procedures. 
The assessment of the regulatory framework as 
a competitive element of the London Stock Exchange 
could indicate the strength of its competitiveness. 
The option to choose between various laws and 
regulations under which to operate by market 
participants could be seen as a flexibility that can 
improve competitiveness. However, the bureaucracy 
involved in the selection and administration 
processes could also hinder the attainment of that 
objective. As opined by Doidge et al. (2009), the 
enactment of numerous laws and regulations could 
also reduce the competitiveness of a stock exchange 
in a similar way to how foreign listings were 
obviously decreased on the NYSE after the passage 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. The 
introduction of both Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) and Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) has 
reduced some of the bureaucratic upheavals at least 
by becoming the key regulators of the financial 
services industry in the UK.  
 
4.2.8. Market bureaucracy and ease of operations 
 
According to reports by the London Stock Exchange, 
the management of the exchange has been 
undertaking a series of actions since the 1986 ‘Big-
Bang’ deregulation to reduce its level of bureaucracy 
and improve ease of operations. A technology 
roadmap project has been in the pipeline where 
significant resources are committed to transforming 
the LSE for ease of operations. Part of the project 
includes the establishment of the ‘Infolect market 
data system’, which has already increased the 
trading speed to 15 times faster than before. The 
system provides tick-by-tick (change of a price from 
one trade to another) real-time data that helps in the 
dissemination of pricing and other trading activities 
information. Ernst and Young (2009, p.12) stated 
that the former CEO of the LSE, Clara Fuse, had 
made a declaration that “the heightened speed is 
critical for the LSE to remain competitive globally”. 
Other transformations that have been undertaken to 
minimise market bureaucracy and ensure ease of 
operations include the admission of various 
automated trading systems, such as Instinet, BEST, 
POSIT and TRADE in the market (Lee, 1998). The 
success of these trading systems has made LSE 
become one of the most automated exchanges in the 
world. Of course, these technological advances have 
significantly reduced trading costs and enhanced the 
operational efficiency of stock exchanges (Lee, 2002; 
Macey and O’Hara, 2002; Otchere and Abou-Zeid, 
2008; Hsieh, 2018). Regulatory and corporate 
governance flexibility was also ensured by the 
founding of the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
segment of the Exchange. Small and growing 
companies seeking a listing now face less 
administrative bureaucracy and regulatory 
restrictions, which enhances ease of operations in 
the market. According to the London Stock Exchange 
Group’s (LSEG) Annual Report (2014), there are 
almost 3,500 companies listed on AIM as of March 
2014 and the market has raised over £85 billion of 
equity capital for small companies. Nevertheless, the 
Exchange has been described as having a complex 
regulatory and operational structure that consists of 
numerous requirements, standards and oversight 
functions. 
 
4.2.9. Transparency and competitive practice 
 
The disclosure of pricing procedures and quote 
information (allowing member firms to have access 
to the information and processes undertaken to 
match buy and sell orders such as access to order 
books) has been one of the key elements of 
transparency and competitive practice in stock 
exchanges. If the trading information is published 
(by sending the information to Infolect market data 
system) immediately to all stakeholders (member 
firms), a level playing ground that promotes 
competitiveness would be ensured. The London 
Stock Exchange has standards that are related to 
disclosure of information as part of the continuing 
obligations of all market participants, who are 
mainly the member firms. Some of the requirements 
include the disclosure of a timetable for corporate 
actions, such as business acquisition, that may affect 
the position of existing investors. The argument of 
whether there is transparency in the disclosure of 
pricing information in the LSE has not been resolved. 
There are claims that IPOs in the Exchange lack 
transparency and that gives an added advantage to 
some individuals and institutions (LSEG, 2011). 
Proposed actions, such as the time extension of pre-
IPO engagements with investors and other 
stakeholders, could improve transparency in the 
Exchange. An important step was the 
implementation of a transparency directive effective 
from 20 January 2007 that was undertaken by the 
LSE to boost the level of transparency. The directive 
was designed by the European Commission to 
ensure that the same information disclosure 
framework exists between the European exchanges. 
It stipulates that firms should disclose information 
at regular intervals, such as annually or semi-
annually, or where interim management reports are 
expected for the first and third quarters of the year, 
they should go through the same channels of 
communication as interim management reports to 
managers and directors together with annual or final 
reports to the shareholders. Stock exchanges have 
been claiming to act in a way that enhances 
transparency and competitive practice, but whether 
this actually happens is another question to be 
answered.  
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Table 1. Summary of the competitive attributes and the level of competitiveness in the London Stock 
Exchange 
 
 Competitive attributes Features Findings 
1 
Pricing and trading information 
disclosure 
MillenniumIT provides the numerous 
trading facilities in LSE that are used in 
the pricing of listed securities. 
Full disclosure of trading information 
is part of the requirements in the Rules 
of the Exchange and has always been a 
practice encouraged by the LSE. 
The monopolistic status of 
MillenniumIT may be considered as a 
sign of uncompetitive practice in the 
LSE. 
However, the practice of ensuring full 
disclosure of trading information 
among market participants signifies a 
competitive practice. 
2 Settlement and clearing processes 
The Rules of the Exchange provide 
detailed requirements that must be 
adhered to by the member firms in 
settlement and clearing processes. 
This practice is meant to protect all 
stakeholders and ensure a level playing 
field exists for fair competition. 
3 
Pricing initial public offerings and 
transaction costs 
LSE’s IPO market has been very vibrant 
over the years compared to other 
world major stock exchanges. 
Transaction costs for the LSE have 
been argued to be high compared to 
other stock exchanges, (Financial 
News, 2015). 
The involvement of many financial 
institutions in this process may lead to 
some unethical behaviour due to 
selfish interests. 
High transaction costs are a strong 
indication of uncompetitive practice. 
4 Membership and annual fees 
LSE has made some changes to the 
membership structure of fees, which 
include payment of flat rate annual 
fees instead of using annual headcount 
declarations of activities to calculate 
yearly fees. 
Compared to stock exchanges like the 
NYSE, fees are not fixed but 
determined by the forces of demand 
and supply of membership. 
Despite the effort of the LSE to reduce 
its membership fees and the 
administrative bureaucracy, the 
Exchange’s annual fees remain the 
highest among many top stock 
exchanges in the world. This could 
result in a competitive disadvantage, 
which directly results in uncompetitive 
practice. 
5 
Member firms of the London Stock 
Exchange and their activities 
As of May 2015, the LSE has over 800 
registered member firms that are 
allowed to operate in various market 
segments. 
The existence of numerous 
participants can enhance competition 
in the market. 
However, factors such as high 
membership fees and special segments 
that exist in the market may hinder the 
drive competitiveness in the market. 
6 
Activities of market makers, brokers 
and institutional investors 
There are numerous rules guiding the 
operations of market makers and 
brokers in the LSE. 
It is not easy to determine whether all 
member firms are given equal 
opportunities for participation, or 
whether the rules are effectively 
complied with by all market 
participants. 
7 Regulatory framework 
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
and the Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (PRA) are responsible for the 
various statutory and regulatory 
provisions guiding the operations of 
the LSE. 
The LSE is also a Self-Regulating 
Organisation (SRO) that has specific 
rules and regulations referred to as 
‘Rules of the Exchange’ which provide 
the overall code of conduct in the 
Exchange and are the operational 
requirements for all member firms. 
The assessment of the regulatory 
framework as a competitive element of 
the London Stock Exchange could 
indicate the strength of its 
competitiveness. 
However, the existence of several laws 
may result in a competitive 
disadvantage. 
8 
Market bureaucracy and ease of 
operations 
The founding of the Infolect market 
data system, Alternative Investment 
Market and admission of various 
automated trading systems. 
The success of these transformations 
has ensured ease of operations in LSE 
and improves competitiveness. 
9 Transparency and competitive practice 
The LSE has many standards, rules and 
regulations that are meant to promote 
transparency and competitive practice. 
It is debatable whether the rules and 
regulations with regard to 
transparency and competitive practice 
are being fully complied with. 
Note: Table 1 presents the summary of the competitive attributes of the LSE, and based on the features of those attributes, the 
transparency and effectiveness of the Exchange were evaluated, including a conclusion on its level of competitiveness 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The ambiguity in determining the level of 
competitiveness in the operations of a given stock 
exchange has made it difficult to identify whether 
the London Stock Exchange is competitive. Despite 
the difficulty, this paper has assessed some 
competitive elements in the Exchange that may 
provide an idea of the market’s strengths and 
weaknesses. In the assessment, the characteristics of 
both competitive and uncompetitive practices have 
been observed in the LSE. The key elements that 
enhance the competitiveness of the LSE are the 
continued technology transformation, globalisation 
and flexibilities in choosing the regulations under 
which market participants can operate. In 
technology transformation, the Exchange has 
ensured the successful implementation of various 
automated trading systems that facilitate 
competition among the systems, as well as provide 
an external competitive advantage. It was also found 
that the Exchange has programmes in place to 
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extend its globalisation to countries such as China, 
India and Russia as markets for companies seeking 
new share listings similar to the Exchange’s coverage 
in Italy. In contrast, signs of non-competitiveness 
were also observed and the most prominent are the 
high membership and annual fees, transaction costs 
and stamp duty on shares. The presence of these 
exorbitant charges may not provide a level playing 
ground for all market participants. The existence of 
numerous laws and regulations guiding every aspect 
of trading and other activities in the exchange is 
another indication that such regulations are set 
without consideration to the international 
competition facing the Exchange. The limitations of 
the study include the failure to interview some of 
the market participants on the LSE. Empirical 
analysis and results could have been used to 
support the findings of the paper. Areas such as 
empirically assessing the impact of trading 
information disclosure on pricing efficiency of the 
LSE would have been a perfect example. However, 
since the paper was meant to be qualitative, the 
quantitative method was not employed.    
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